

Berlin Brigade and in other units as well.)

The 3d Battalion's combat cross-country course is basically a timed squad competition, with 8, 9, or 10 men to a squad, depending on unit strength. It includes a four-mile run and a skills station (see illustration). Each squad runs the course as a team in full battle gear (LBE, weapon, mask, soft cap), and each must carry one PRC-77 radio and one M16/M203; all other squad members carry their individual M16 rifles.

The squads cross the starting line at five-minute intervals and run two miles cross-country to the skills area. The squad must enter the area as a unit. The members first put on their gas masks, then negotiate a wire obstacle, throw hand grenades, and engage targets with their M16 rifles using live fire. (The hand grenade throw is scored, as is the 10-round live fire exercise; each is worth 25 percent of the total score. The overall squad completion time accounts for the other 50 percent.)

The time clock runs the whole time the soldiers are in the skills area. When they have completed the live fire exercise, the squad members are allowed to unmask after which they complete the last two miles of the run. During this last run, the faster runners can proceed at their own pace and thereby improve the squad's overall time, which is computed as an average of all the individual times.

The top-scoring squads are recognized with medals and trophies given in appropriate ceremonies. Without exception, the soldiers who have participated say that they have learned a lot about themselves and their units in the course of this physically demanding training.

Many aspects of this cross-country course can easily be modified to fit local situations. Smoke, CS, and overhead fire (with blanks) can be used to add realism to the skills area. The area itself can include other challenges as well, such as obstacles, slides, RTO procedures, and SQT or ARTEP tasks.

The entire event can end with a squad in an assembly area receiving an operations order for a squad live fire assault. This would be an excellent test of a unit's ability to survive great stress and physical exertion and still be prepared to fight. The scoring of the competition can also be modified to stress any skill that is included.

Events of this nature, incorporated into a comprehensive training program, can help keep units ready to go around the clock. What may be more important — the soldiers will know that they are ready and will take great pride in their readiness.



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## Resupply By Rappel

MASTER SERGEANT DAVE GOLDIE


Any combat or combat support unit that conducts sustained operations in a jungle environment eventually needs a resupply of water. This is particularly true of the units that come to Panama for training at the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC), because their soldiers drink more water while becoming acclimatized to the heat.

For years these units have been frustrated by the terrain and the "enemy"

actions that make flying water into a landing zone (LZ) a difficult procedure. They have tried numerous alternatives, but always without much success: When they used parachute drops, they couldn't find the supplies on the ground. When they tried kicking rubber bladders out of low-flying helicopters, the bladders burst on impact. When they moved the unit to an LZ and delivered water in five-gallon cans by

helicopter, they always seemed to encounter the opposing forces.

Searching for a quick, reliable, and practical method of resupplying these units with water, the Jungle Warfare Branch of the JOTC hit upon a system that is virtually foolproof and that has numerous other applications as well. The system incorporates some ingenious uses of readily available equipment with an innovative reorganiza-



tion of rappelling procedures. It permits a unit to deliver supplies of all kinds anywhere in the jungle, even through a triple canopy if necessary, thus reducing exposure to enemy fire.

Using a standard basic-issue duffel bag, two collapsible, plastic five-gallon water bottles, a Swiss seat, and one extra snaplink, the JOTC instructors devised a method of packaging water, food, or ammunition for delivery from a helicopter. By using their reverse belay system, one man in a helicopter can lower more than 400 pounds easily and with total control over the load's rate of descent. Needless to say, a heavy load must be rigged so that there is no chance that any part of it can fall while it is being lowered.

## EQUIPMENT

The equipment needed for this type of resupply mission includes:

- A duffel bag (with sling ropes or A7A straps and D-rings to secure larger loads, such as engineer boxes, and to provide a fixed sling point).
- Several snaplinks to attach the rappel ropes to the load and to use in lowering the load.
- A donut ring (as described in Change 1, FM 57-38, Pathfinder

Operations Manual).

- One climbing rope for loads weighing less than 100 pounds (two for loads over 100 pounds).

- Leather work gloves for the belayman and a rope deployment bag (see article in *INFANTRY*, November-December 1982, p. 31).

After the load is properly rigged, the climbing rope is attached to the load at the sling point, which should be directly over the center of gravity when the load is placed in the position in which it is to land. (For details on how to prepare the duffel bag load for water resupply, see the accompanying sketch).

The rappel ropes are run through a snaplink attached to a donut ring on the same side of the aircraft from which the load is to be lowered. The ropes are routed through this snaplink in the same manner as a rappeller would be hooked up (an extra turn of the rope can be added for loads over 250 pounds).

The ropes are then run through to a snaplink on the opposite side of the donut ring, around the belayman's back, to a rope deployment bag on the floor of the aircraft opposite the load.

The belayman sits on the floor in the center of the aircraft as far forward as he can get and facing the rear of the air-

craft. He is held in place by seatbelts. The rope runs from the second snaplink around the belayman's back, then to the hand closest to the load. The hand farthest from the load is used to break the load's fall, using the chest belay.

The rope deployment bag, fastened to the floor of the aircraft near the belayman's brake hand, contains all the excess rope and prevents the loose rope from becoming a safety hazard.

When the helicopter is over the correct location, the rappel master first ensures that nobody is under the load. Then he and his assistant, who are fastened into the aircraft, pull enough slack in the rope to allow the load to be pushed slowly outside the aircraft. Once the load is outside, the belayman follows the hand and arm signals of the rappel master, who watches the load to see that it is lowered safely to the ground.

Two or more loads can be lowered, but only one at a time. The helicopter crew must be kept informed of when each load is going to be moved outside the aircraft, as it will cause a shift in the helicopter's center of gravity.

## ROPES

If the ropes must be retrieved, the rappel master and his assistant pull them back inside the aircraft while the belayman stores them in a laundry or sand bag. In case of emergency, the ropes should be cut immediately and allowed to fall to the ground.

This duffel bag method is particularly useful for combat units; once the bag is on the ground, a squad member can retrieve it and move out quickly, if enemy action dictates, using the bag's shoulder straps to carry the load on his back.

The system is also a particular boon to engineer parties sent in to clear LZs. They can now be flown to the exact location of the proposed LZ, rappel in, and have their equipment belayed in right behind them.

Other units that are being taught these methods are also impressed. In fact, the 82d Airborne Division took

the JOTC's innovation a step further, substituting five-quart plastic water bottles from Air Force survival kits for the five-gallon collapsible jugs. This means that once a duffel bag is on the ground a squad member can pick it up and move from position to position, issuing water to the soldiers without the delay and spillage of transferring it to individual canteens.

While the JOTC recognizes that this resupply system may not be logical to use in some terrain, it feels the system is worthy of consideration by any unit that moves in the field.

The JOTC also welcomes any suggestions from units serving anywhere in the world that would make fighting in the jungle easier for the soldier on the ground.



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# OPFOR Training

**CAPTAIN JOHN H. PERRY**

The opposing forces (OPFOR) program, formally initiated in 1978, is a great improvement over the old aggressor program, which it replaced.

The aggressor program called for a unit to represent an adversary, but an imaginary one and one that used its usual U.S.-style maneuver, formations, and equipment. Under the OPFOR program, by contrast, the unit designated to act as the OPFOR is more realistic: It is trained to use the tactics, formations, and doctrine of a potentially real adversary (usually the Soviet Union or North Korea) in maneuvers against U.S. units in training.

The U.S. Army FORSCOM OPFOR Training Detachment (RED THRUST) at Fort Hood, Texas, has the mission of training OPFOR units throughout the FORSCOM area, including Alaska and Panama. Unfortunately, though, this program has not progressed as rapidly as it should have. In fact, with the exception of the OPFOR units at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, which was trained by a RED THRUST team in late 1981, no organized OPFOR maneuver units

were being used at the various installations in the Army at the time this article was written.

Although many of these installations do have an OPFOR cadre to monitor the program and to conduct limited training, in most cases this training includes little more than Threat awareness. A week-long training session, for example, might feature as its main elements a day in the life of Ivan — consisting of Soviet style meals, PT, indoctrination, and training and discipline; familiarization firing with or demonstration of Soviet weapons; driving or riding in Soviet combat vehicles; and classes on Soviet tactics and capabilities.

Real OPFOR training includes much more: Classes on Soviet tactics, formations, signals and radio procedures; terrain board exercises with models; and full-scale practice in applying what has been learned in class. These practical applications include walk-throughs with drivers and vehicle commanders practicing the formations and signals; vehicle-mounted motorized rifle company (MRC) formations and tactics; an MRC defense (strongpoint); and basic motorized

rifle battalion (MRB) offensive formations and tactics combining three MRCs under a central commander. The value of this kind of training has been proved at the NTC.

In 24 training days, a 12-man team of instructors from RED THRUST trained an armor battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion to act as an OPFOR against units that would later rotate through the NTC for training. Units of these two battalions were trained to act as three MRBs, a tank battalion, an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance company, an antitank guided missile battery, a ZSU-23/4 section of an air defense battery, and an organic motorized rifle regiment (MRR) engineer unit.

These units perform their missions with doctrinally correct tactics and formations and with a speed and aggressiveness that usually surprises the units in training. In the process, they have convinced both the participants and the observers that there is a vital need for OPFOR training back at their home stations. They know that without it their soldiers will not be properly prepared to face the speed, the aggressiveness, or the